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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the ~latter of the Estate of J A:JIES ? 
JOHX LATSIS (also sOinetimes 
known as "LATSES"), 
Deceased ) 
Case No. 
7954 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
The respondents, Yirginia Latsis Zambukos and 
Utah Savings & Trust Company, both contend in their 
briefs that the appointment of an attorney for absentee 
heirs and minors under Section 75-14-25, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, vests such an attorney with full power 
not only to represent such heirs at all proceedings after 
his appointment, including confirmations of sales, settle-
ments, partitions and distributions of estates, but gives 
him the right of compromise and adjustment. In fact, 
they claim that he is practically an attorney in fact. 
They seem to lay considerable stress upon the words 
"settlements" and "distributions." 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
MEANING OF THE WORD "SETTLEMENT". 
POINT 2. 
LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY OF AN ATTORNEY 
APPOINTED UNDER SECTION 75-14-25, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953. 
POINT 3. 
DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION OF OCTOBER 9, 1945, IN 
ITS PRESENT FORM, IS VOID. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
MEANING OF THE WORD "SETTLEMENT". 
The word "settlement" does not include a compro-
mise. "Settlernent", as used in this statute, means as 
follows: 
Joyner et u.r. r. City of Seattle, (\Vash.) 258 Pac. 
479: 
"Compromise is the purchase of peace ( 12 C . 
• J. 315) ; and, as a corollary, settlement is the 
consummation thereof." 
Black's Lw1-· Dictionary, Third Edition, at page 161:~, 
defines the word ":.;et tlement" in connection with pro hate 
practice as follows: 
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"The settlement of an estate consists in its 
administration bv the executor or administrator 
carried so far tha·t all debts and legacies have been 
paid and the individual shares of distributees in 
the corpus of the estate, or the residuary portion, 
as the case Inay he, definitely ascertained and 
deterniined, and accounts filed and passed, so 
that nothing remains but to make final distribu-
tion. ~ee Calkins v. ~mith, -+1 :Jlich. 409, 1 N. W. 
10-18: Forbes Y. Harrington, 171 ~Ia~~. 386, 50 N. 
E. 6-!1: ~-\ppeal of .Jiathe"·~, 7:2 Conn. 555, 45 A. 
170; Pearce Y. Pearce, 199 Ala. -191, 7 4 So. 952, 
957." 
TVords a.nd Phra.ses, Pennanent Edition, Volun1e 39, 
page 67, in discussing the word "settlen1ent'' in connec-
tion with an estate, sets forth as follows: 
"'Ordinarily, 'settlen1ent of an estate' Ineans 
payment of taxes and debts and distribution of 
estate among those entitled thereto. In re 
\Yraught's Estate, 32 A. 2d 8, 9, 347 Pa. 165. * * * 
The 'settle1nent of an estate' is the process by 
which letters testamentary or of administration 
are granted, assets collected, claims allowed, debts 
paid, real estate sold if necessary for the payment 
of debts, and the property distributed to those 
who are entitled to it by the laws of descent or by 
the will. In re Bishop's Estate, 18 N. E. 2d 218, 
219, 370 Ill. 173." 
POINT 2. 
LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY OF AN ATTORNEY 
APPOINTED UNDER SECTION 75'-14-25, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953. 
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4 
It is contended by respondents that we do not 
question the constitutionality of the statute or the 
appointment of Mr. CotroManes thereunder. It is true 
that we do not question 1ihe constitutionality of the 
statute nor the authority of the court to appoint l\Ir. 
Cotro-Manes under the statute. However, we do question 
the extent of his authority and power under such an 
appointment. 
Our statute was adopted in 1898 and known as 
Section 4050 of the Revised Statutes of rtah of 1898. It 
was taken from the California Code of Ciril Procedurr, 
Section 1718, which statute is as follows: 
"Sec. 1718. At or before the hearing of peti-
tions and contests for the probate of wills, for 
letters testamentary or of administration; for 
sales of real estate, and confirmations thereof, 
settlements, partitions, and distribution of estatr~ 
setting apart homesteads, and all other proceed-
ings where all the parties interested in the estate 
are required to be notified thereof - the court 
may, in its discretion, appoint some competent 
attorney at law to represent in all such proceed-
ings the devisees, legatees, heirs, or creditors of 
the decedent who are minors and have no general 
guardian in the county, or who are non-residents 
of the state; and those interested who, though 
they are neither such minors or nonresidents, are 
unrepresented. The order must specif~· the names 
of the parties so far as known for whom the attor-
ney is appointed, who is thereh~· authorized to 
represent such parties in all such proceedings had 
subsequent to his appointment. The attorney ma~· 
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receiYe a fee, to be fixed by the court, for his 
seiTices, which must be paid out of the funds of 
the estate as necessary expenses of administra-
tion, and upon distribution may be charged to the 
party represented by the attorney. If, for any 
cause, it becomes necessary, the court may sub-
stitute another attorney for the one first ap-
pointed, in which case the fee must be propor-
tionately divided. The non-appointment of an 
attorney will not affect the validity of any of the 
proceedings." 
At the time it was adopted from California, there were-
two California court decisions construing this statute. 
One was the case of the Estate of James Devoe, Deceased, 
::M~yrick's Probate Reports, page 6. This case was 
decided in San Francisco in 1872. The deceased died 
and left his widow, an adult son and a minor 'SOn sur-
viving him. The adult son was named executor under the 
will. At the time the petition for probate of the will was 
heard, the court appointed an attorney to represent the 
minor. A contest of the will was filed by the widow and 
the minor. Later the contest was withdrawn and the 
will was admitted to probate upon the stipulation of the 
widow and the attorney appointed to represent the 
minor. A year later a general guardian wa:s appointed 
for the minor and he filed a contest of the will. The 
executor objected and the court held: 
"Held, an attorney appointed by the court 
cannot waive any right of his ward: the, infant 
was not bound by the acts of the attorney. Objec-
tion overruled." 
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(The above volun1e is not available at the State 
Capital but may be found at the University of rtah Law 
Library.) 
The other case, decided in 1892, was the Estate of 
William P. Fuller, Deceased, 2 Coffey's Probate Deci-
sions 521: 
"Mr. Lyons was appointed by an order of 
this court, dated June 13, 1890, to represent cer-
tain minor heirs of decedent in proceedings in 
probate of will and administration of estate in 
this department. * * * 
Mr. Lyons was not, and could not have been, 
appointed to represent the estate. The attorney 
for the executrix was employed and is allowed 
cmnpensation to manage the legal affairs of the 
estate. He is accountable for the proper perform-
ance of his duties as such attorney. He prepares 
all the papers, appears as the principal repre-
sentative in the court, is looked to h)' the court 
as responsible for the conduct of the legal affair~, 
while the appointed attorney is an auxiliary of the 
court, and his service is, in a sense, subordinate. 
He acts as a scrutineer of the affairs of admini~­
tration, a challenger and critic of the management 
of the estate, and is expected to advise the court, 
from time to time, as to any default or dereliction 
on the part of the administrator or executor." 
Since the adoption of the California statute h)' Ftali, 
the following interpretations haYe been placed upon the 
California statute: 
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11 Cal. Ju.r., Section 793, Page 120-l: 
.. Sec. 793. In General. - A statute, in force 
for Inany years, but now repealed, provided that 
at or before the hearing of petitions and contests 
for probate of wills, for letters, for sales of real 
estate and confirmations, settlemenh;, partitions 
and distributions of estates, setting apart hOine-
steads, and all other proceedin~s where all parties 
interested in the estate were required to be noti-
fied, the court n1ight in its discretion appoint 
son1e competent attorney to represent the 
deYisees, legatees, heirs or creditors of the dece-
dent, who were minors and had no general guard-
ian in the county or who ''Tere nonresidents of the 
state, as well as those who, though neither minors 
or nonresidents, were unrepresented. It was 
further provided, however, that the nonappoint-
ment of an attorney would not affect the validity 
of any of the proceedings. It was solely for the 
probate court to determine whether to appoint 
such attorney, and the appointment was in its 
discretion. The rule was, however, that the court 
would not make an appointment except in case~ 
where manifestly necessary, and in no case upon 
the suggestion of the executor or administrator 
or other person in adverse interest. Such a.ttorney 
acted only as a scrutineer of the affa,irs of 
administration, to advise the court of any default 
or dereliction on the part of the e.recutor or 
administrator. He could not institute proceedings, 
but could only be appointed after some other 
person had instituted proceedings of which the 
court had jurisdiction of the heirs, and he could 
not invest the court with jurisdiction of the per-
son of the minor heirs which it had not already 
acquired, nor 1raire any riqht of tlle heir. Such an 
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at~orney could not be appointed for an absent 
heu already represented by an attorney, and as 
soon as the absent heir was represented hy an 
attorney employed by himself the functions of the 
appointee ceased. Absent heirs who were sui 
juris were entitled to a substitution of an attor-
ney of their own selection. While the section was 
in force, there was no need for the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem for a minor heir. And 
since the repeal of the statute, the court has no 
power to appoint an attorney to represent minor 
heirs as such, and seems to be limited to the 
general laws of guardianship. 
It is still provided as to proceedings to deter-
Inine heirship that the court may appoint an 
attorney for any minor mentioned in said pro-
ceedings not having a guardian." (Italics ours). 
In re Lux's Estate, (Cal.) 66 Pac. 30. The court, in 
discussing Section 1718 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
states as follows: 
"The statute is a very extraordinary one, but 
some of its provisions have been in force since 
1851, without any serious challenge of its validity. 
The court can no more appoint an attorney trith 
authority to bind a person u:lw is sui .furis, to 
waive his rights, or concede claims ma.de against 
him, or to institute proceedings for 71 im, and 
incur costs chargeable to him, than it ran do all 
these things without an attorney. And thi~, I 
think, indicates the functions of an attorney so 
appointed. The court can do nothing with the 
aid of the attorney which it could not have done 
without him. He receives his authority only from 
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the court, and not at all from the absent heir. As 
friend of the court, his function simply is to aid 
the court i.n conserring the rights of ~tnreprc­
sented parties. In all the proceedings specified 
there n1ight be a reason for securing such aid. 
\Vitnesses 1night be examined; and although, as 
a rule, whenever there was reason for a contro-
versy, son1e heir would be on hand to perform the 
duty, still, on rare occasions, the contrary might 
be the case. On anY other view as to the nature 
of the duties of such attorney, the validity of the 
statute could only be sustained on the theory 
that succession being a matter of legislative con-
trol, the legislature has the power to authorize 
a probate judge to give some portion of each 
estate to such attorneys as he should designate. 
\Y e are not at liberty to attribute such motive to 
the legislators; nor was it, I am convinced, so in 
fact. The appointment is authorized only for a 
devisee, legatee, heir, or creditor. Before the 
appointment can be made, the court must be 
satisfied that such persons exist, and the order 
1nust designate who they are, or otherwise the 
fee allowed cannot be charged to the person repre-
sented by the attorney. If their names are not 
known, they must still be identified in some mode 
in the order. It is evident that an attorney can-
not be appointed for an absent heir who is already 
represented by an attorney. A provision for the 
appointment of an attorney in such a case would 
serve no useful purpose, and it would add greatly 
to the objections to the statute, to suppose that 
it was intended to forbid a party the right to be 
represented by his own attorney, a,nd compel him. 
to accept and be bowrul by the acts of an attorney 
appointed without his consent. And it follows 
that, as soon as the absent heir is represented 
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10 
by an attorney employed by himself, the functions 
of the appointee cease. These last consequences 
would follow though the validity of the statute 
were conceded to the fullest extent." (Italics 
ours). 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota in the case of 
In re Otting's Estate, (S. D.) 252 N. W. 740, approves 
the same limitation placed on a similar statute as was 
construed in the Lux case. The court states: 
"The justification for the appointment of an 
attorney under section 3195 and his function when 
appointed we believe to be rightly stated in the 
Lux case when the court :said: 'The court can no 
more appoint an attorney with authority to bind 
a person who is sui juris, to waive his rights, or 
concede claims made against him, or to institute 
proceedings for him, and incur costs chargeable 
to him, than it can do all these things without an 
attorney. And this, I think, indicates the functions 
of an attorney so appointed. The court can do 
nothing with the aid of the attorney which it 
could not have done without him. He receives his 
authority only from the court, and not at all from 
the absent heir. As friend of the court, his func-
tion simply is to aid the court in conserving the 
rights of unrepresented parties." 
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that an 
attorney appointed under our statute has merely limited 
power, and that is to protect the rights of heirs and 
minors, and does not have the general power to compro-
mise or waive any of their rights or claims. 
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POINT 3. 
DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION OF OCTOBER 9, 1945, IN 
ITS PRESENT FORl\I, IS VOID. 
~-ls the above authorities indicate, the court cannot 
do with an attorney what it could have done without hav-
ing appointed an attorney, and there can be no question 
that the court would not have ordered distribution in the 
manner it has in this estate unless the heirs had con-
sented and acquiesced thereto. The court would have 
required the estate to be distributed in accordance with 
our laws of succession. In fact, it would not have had the 
power to do otherwise. The court was without judicial 
power to render the particular judgment or decree. The 
decree of distribution of October 9, 1945, in its present 
form, is void. Winona Oil Co. v. Barnes, (Okl.) 200 Pac. 
981: 
.. In the body of the opinion the court, using 
part of its own language and quoting from Bailey 
on Jurisdiction, stated as follows: 
'A court must proceed and determine within 
the limits of the power conferred. If it renders a 
judgment in an action or proceeding, where juris-
diction has attached, that it was not authorized 
or empowered to render at all, such judgment or 
decree is in excess of its jurisdiction, and for that 
reason a nullity. So, if it render a judgment or 
decree which is within its authority as to part 
only, but includes also that which is not within 
its power, the excess will be a nullity, and if the 
valid and invalid parts are independent of each 
other, the whole will not be void, but only such 
part as is in excess of the powers of the court.' 
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Let us apply the sa1ne principle to the case 
at bar. Conceding the petition sufficient, the 
court had authority to order a sale of the oil and 
gas lease to the highest and best bidder. The 
court did not order the sale of an oil and gas lease 
to the highest and best bidder, but ordered it 
sold to the Winona Oil Company. This order 
was void, and the proceedings had in carrying 
into effect said order was likewise void, for want 
of authority in the court to make the order. 
A judgment is void when it affirmatively 
appears from an inspection of the judgment roll 
that any one of three following jurisdictional ele-
ments are absent: First, jurisdidion over the 
person; second, jurisdiction of the subject-matter; 
and, third, judicial power to render the particular 
judgment. Oklahoma City v. Corporation Com-
mission, 195 Pac. 498; Roth v. Union National 
Bank, supra. 
In the case of Pettis v. Johnston, 190 Pac. 
681, this court, in passing upon the effect of a 
judgment void upon its face, stated as follows: 
'A judgment which is void upon its face, and 
requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to 
demonstrate its want of validity, is a 'dead limb 
upon the judicial tree, which may be chopped off 
at any time'; it can bear no fruit to the plaintiff, 
but is a constant menace to the defendant, and 
may be vacated by the court rendered it 'at any 
time on motion of a party or an~' person affected 
thereby,' either before or after the expiration of 
three years from the rendition of such void judg-
Inent. Such 1notion is unhampered h~· a limitation 
of time.'" 
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Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Yolume 1, 
Section 825, Page 650: 
"'Broadly speaking, nullity of judgments 
results from one or more of the following eau~es: 
1. \Y ant of a legally organized rourt or tribunal; 
2. \Yant of requisite jurisdiction over the subject 
matter or the parties or both: 3. \Yant of power 
to grant the relief contained in the judgment." 
Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Volume 1, 
Section 35-1, Page 733: 
''It is very easy to conceive of judgments 
which, though entered in cases over which the 
court had undoubted jurisdiction, are void because 
they decided some questions which it had no 
power to decide, or granted some relief which it 
had no power to grant, and yet it will probably 
not be possible to formulate any test by which to 
unerringly determine whether the action of the 
court is in similar cases void, or erroneous only. 
'It is well settled by the authorities that a judg-
ment nmy be void for want of authority in a 
court to render the particular judgment rendered 
though the court may have had jurisdiction over 
the subject matter and the parties.' But under 
such circumstances the court should not be held 
to have lost jurisdiction unless it clearly appears 
that it entered a decree not authorized under the 
facts or not warranted by law. Nevertheless in 
the actual rendition of the judgment, the court 
1nust remain within its jurisdiction and powers. 
For it is the power or authority behind a judg~ 
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ment, rather than the mere result reached, which 
determines its validity and immunity from col-
lateral attack. A wrong decision made within the 
limits of the court's authority is error correctable 
on appeal or other direct review, but a wrong, or 
for that matter a correct, decision where the court 
in rendering it oversteps its jurisdiction and 
power is void and may be set aside either direct]~· 
or collaterally. Such excess of authorit~· or power 
is akin to a want of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, the nature and requisites of which are 
treated in earlier sections of this chapter." 
As indicated by the above authorities, the mere appoint-
ment of Mr. Cotro-Manes under Section 7:'5-14-:!:'5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, did not improve the E:ituation or 
make the manner of distribution legal. 
The contention made by respondent Yirginia LatE:is 
Zambukos that distribution might have been held up 
indefinitely is not true. This estate could have been 
handled in one of two ways. They could have gotten thr 
consent and ratification of the heirs, which wa~ contem-
plated by the stipulation entered into, or they could have 
distributed the estate in accordance with the provisions 
of our laws of succession. As to making actual transfer 
or delivery of funds or property to the absent heirs, 
there are ample provisions in our :-;tatute for ~ueh, but 
this question is not here involved. 
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CONCLUSION 
\Ye respectfully submit that the petitions of the 
heirs should not have been dismissed and that further 
administration of this estate, including an order for 
final distribution in accordance with the laws of succes-
sion, should be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\VHITE, WRIGHT& ARNOVITZ, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 
~IATTSSON, 
JAl\IES W. BELESS, JR., 
Attorneys for Petitioners and 
Appellants 
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